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This paper explores whether there was an economically significant differential in market-based 
risk between bank holding companies (BHCs) with Section 20 subsidiaries – subsidiaries that were 
authorized by the Federal Reserve to conduct bank-ineligible securities activities – and BHCs without 
such subsidiaries. Using market returns over a period of time in which BHCs expanded into securities 
activities, from 1985 through 1999, this study finds evidence that BHCs that participated in investment 
banking exhibited significantly lower total and unsystematic risk, suggesting that banks’ participation in 
the securities business resulted in diversification gains. However, BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries 
exhibited higher systematic risk.   
 
 














2BANKS IN THE SECURITIES BUSINESS: MARKET-BASED RISK IMPLICATIONS OF 
SECTION 20 SUBSIDIARIES 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Historically, regulatory barriers and restrictions governing the operations of U.S. commercial 
banks often prohibited banks from expanding their operations into nonbank activities. Specifically, 
Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 expressly prohibited banks from any affiliations with 
organizations engaged in the underwriting, sale, or distribution of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or 
other securities.
1 The regulation was driven by a concern about the possible increase in riskiness and 
negative effects on the overall safety and soundness of the banking system that may arise when BHCs 
engage in both commercial banking and investment banking activities.   
In the last two decades, U.S. banking organizations have sought broader domestic securities 
underwriting powers. In 1987, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) authorized limited underwriting activity for 
previously prohibited securities. In 1989, the Fed allowed Section 20 subsidiaries of commercial bank 
holding companies to underwrite corporate debt and equity securities, with financial and informational 
firewalls between the BHC and its Section 20 subsidiary. But the general prohibition on domestic 
securities underwriting by U.S. banks remained in place until 1999, when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA), also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act, was passed.   
  In the debate leading up to the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act researchers 
analyzed various costs and benefits of universal banking, including the effect of a securities underwriter 
on the safety and soundness of a consolidated company. The existing empirical literature has provided 
mixed results. On the one hand, because securities activities are inherently riskier than traditional 
commercial banking activities (Boyd and Graham, 1986; Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt, 1993), expansion 
into this line of business may increase BHCs’ risk. A BHC may become exposed to the losses of its 
                                                           
1 The Banking Act of 1933, commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act, 48 Stat. 162, is codified at various 
sections of Title 12 of the United States Code, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh). Section 20 of the act required 
member banks to eliminate any affiliations with organizations “engaged principally in the issue, flotation, 
 
 
3Section 20 underwriter, particularly if the firewalls that can insulate and protect it from risks of nonbank 
activities are not enforced.     
On the positive side, there is a potential for product diversification and increased earnings from 
underwriting activities. A number of studies have analyzed the potential benefits of diversification by 
looking at the correlation between BHCs’ subsidiaries returns. (Saunders and Cornett, 2003, provide a 
comprehensive literature review of these studies.) Wall and Eisenbeis (1984) found that over the period 
1970-1980, the correlation between bank earnings and security broker/dealer earnings was negative, 
indicating potential gains from diversification. Kwan (1998) studied domestic BHCs with Section 20 
subsidiaries from 1990 through 1997. He conducted an analysis of the return relationship between 
banking and securities activities, where securities affiliates were further separated into primary dealers 
(primary dealers of government securities) and nonprimary dealers. He reported that Section 20 
subsidiaries typically posted more volatile accounting returns than commercial banking subsidiaries, 
although not necessarily higher returns.  
The majority of the available empirical studies on the risks of securities underwriting activities 
estimated implied volatility of returns using simulation or hypothetical-merger methods that create 
synthetic universal banks composed of portfolios of commercial banks and securities and other nonbank 
entities (Wall and Eisenbeis, 1984; Boyd and Graham, 1986; Boyd and Graham, 1988; Boyd, Hanweck, 
and Hewitt, 1993; Allen and Jagtiani, 1996).  Simulation studies are subject to aggregation bias resulting 
from using industry data. This paper uses a fundamentally different approach by evaluating the risk of 
banking organizations that actually engaged in securities activities. This approach allows me to examine 
the product mix effects within established, integrated production processes, rather than artificially 
combining earnings streams generated by unrelated financial entities. 
Unlike many previous studies that examine accounting-based measures of risk (Boyd, Hanweck, 
and Hewitt, 1993; Saunders and Walter, 1996; among others), this paper examines the market-based risk 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stock, bonds, 
debentures, notes, or other securities.” (12 U.S.C. § 377).  
 
 
4of banking organizations that engaged in securities activities. One of the advantages of using market data 
is that they are less likely to be affected by the firm’s choice of accounting methods. Furthermore, the 
market price of risk reflects the actual cost of capital faced by the firm (Allen and Jagtiani, 1999).   
Market-based measures of risk are used in the event studies by Bhargava and Fraser (1998), Cornett, Ors, 
and Tehranian (2002), and Akhigbe and Whyte (2004). These studies examine the market risk effects of 
various regulatory decisions pertaining to bank expansion into investment banking activities. The results 
are mixed. While Bhargava and Fraser (1998) and Akhigbe and Whyte (2004) find a significant increase 
in both total and unsystematic risk, Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian (2002) find no significant impact on bank 
risk.   
The present study does not attempt to examine the effects of events that permitted BHCs to 
underwrite securities. Even some researchers who use an event study methodology to test the effect of 
regulatory changes note that such studies are prone to a number of biases arising from the difficulty of 
“identification of information arrival, partial anticipation of announcements, event clustering, and 
potential event-induced variance changes” (Bhargava and Fraser, 1998).  Instead, this paper uses a longer 
time frame, 1985 through 1999, to examine whether there was an economically significant differential in 
market risk between BHCs with securities powers and those BHCs without such powers.  I argue that the 
discrepancy in market risk between these groups of BHCs is likely to be more apparent in the long run.  
The choice of the time period is important, since it includes the period leading up to when the Fed 
allowed commercial bank holding companies to establish separate Section 20 securities affiliates (before 
1987), to 1999, when passage of GLBA resulted in a significant reduction in the number of Section 20 
reporters.
2  Securities underwriters that are subsidiaries of financial holding companies (FHC) are no 
longer required to file a separate report with the Fed. 
                                                           
2 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 allowed a qualified BHC to convert into a financial holding company and 
not file reports on its Section 20 subsidiaries.  As a result, the number of securities subsidiaries filing Section 20 
reports dwindled from 37 in 1999 to only five in 2001, and these companies were no longer representative of 
companies involved in securities activities. 
 
 
5While regulators are concerned about total risk, market participants consider systematic risk a 
more relevant measure of risk that can be used in the risk-adjusted cost of capital calculations. This study 
estimates total, systematic, and unsystematic risk using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) for BHCs 
with and without Section 20 affiliates. This study illustrates that while systematic risk of all BHCs rose in 
the late 1980s and during the 1990s, BHCs that did not participate in Section 20 activities exhibited lower 
market risk compared to that of BHCs with Section 20 affiliates. However, the overall level of risk and 
unsystematic risk of BHCs with Section 20 activities declined during the 1990s. These results are an 
important extension of the findings of previous studies that argue that expanded bank powers, as 
permitted under the Financial Services Modernization Act, are likely to lower the total risk of the U.S. 
banking industry (Allen and Jagtiani, 1999). Because data used in this study are not for hypothetically 
merged universal banks, the results are more reliable and applicable.    
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets forth the hypotheses of this study and 
discusses the risk-return methodology of the CAPM.  Section 3 discusses results of the CAPM estimation, 
and Section 4 concludes this study. 
 
2.   Hypotheses, methodology, and sample selection 
 
2.1.  Hypotheses  
 
When the Fed allowed BHCs to establish separate underwriting Section 20 affiliates in 1987, it 
effectively reduced restrictions on permissible bank activities that existed since the passage of the 
Banking Act of 1933. Despite the regulatory precautions in the form of information and financial 
firewalls between the parent BHCs and their securities affiliates, this move allowed BHCs to select from a 
broader array of potential portfolio risks. On the one hand, the expanded investment opportunity profile 
can result in enhanced diversification, particularly if the return correlations between business lines are 
less than perfectly correlated (Wall and Eisenbeis, 1984; Kwast, 1989; Saunders and Walter, 1994; and 
Kwan, 1998).  It is surmised that universal banks have some advantages over specialized banks because 
 
 
6they can develop a wider and a longer-term relationship with borrowers. This relationship allows the bank 
to collect more information about the firm’s behavior with respect to various financial instruments and 
use this information more efficiently when extending credit to the firm (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).     
Besides having economies of scope in information gathering, universal banks may also benefit from the 
conventional technological economies of scope because they can spread the fixed costs over a wider set of 
products or they can use their existing branch networks and other delivery channels to distribute 
additional products at low marginal cost (Santos, 1998). Thus, we would expect BHCs with securities 
underwriting powers to exhibit lower risk than BHCs without such powers. 
On the other hand, risk may actually increase as banks expand into new activities. Research into 
the relationship between bank diversification and risk shows that better diversified banks may 
counterbalance their diversification advantage by pursuing riskier activities (Demsetz and Strahan, 1995a, 
b). Banks’ decision to participate in these activities depends on their assessment of profitability of new 
activity mix. It also depends on their preferences regarding risk. The securities business is inherently 
more risky than traditional banking activities. Thus, given the increased scope of permissible activities, 
BHCs with Section 20 affiliates can exhibit higher risk than BHCs without Section 20 affiliates. The next 
section explores whether there exists an economically significant differential in market risk between these 
groups of BHCs using the CAPM methodology. 
 
2.2.  Methodology 
 
  Total risk is estimated using the variance of market-based returns, (
2
RX σ ), for each BHC with and 
without Section 20 subsidiaries, and the results are compared based on the group variance comparison 
tests. Systematic risk is estimated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe 
(1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972). CAPM defines the systematic risk of a security in terms of 
market risk factor, beta, and quantifies the tradeoff between beta of a security and its expected return.   
This can be expressed as follows:  
 
 


















    
where Rm is the return on the market portfolio; Rf is the return on the risk-free asset; and  im β  measures the 
risk of security i in the market portfolio relative to the risk of the market portfolio itself. The Sharpe-
Lintner version can be expressed in terms of returns in excess of the risk-free rate. Let RXi and RXm 
represent excess return on the i
th asset and market, respectively. Then, because the risk-free rate is being 



















      
  Implementation of the model requires three inputs: the stock’s return, the risk-free return, and the 
market risk premium. The usual estimator of beta is the cross-section time-series estimator of the slope 
coefficient in the excess-return market model: 
Equation 3 
1 it im i mt it RX RX α β =+ + ε ,       
where i denotes a security or an asset and t denotes time.     
  To measure systematic risk of BHCs with and without Section 20 affiliates, I extend the market 
model in Equation 3 by adding an interaction term between the dummy variable for Section 20 affiliates 
and RXm (the return on the market portfolio in excess of the return on a risk-free asset). The model is 
written as: 
Equation 4 
12 20* it im i mt i mt it RX RX Sec RX α ββ =+ + + ε  
 
 
8where Sec20 is the dummy variable for BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries.  1 β captures the systematic 
risk of a BHC and reflects the comovement of its returns with the market portfolio returns. For a BHC 










.  A positive coefficient  2 β  would suggest that the sensitivity of BHCs’ returns to the 
changes in market returns is higher in the presence of a Section 20 subsidiary.   
  For the systematic risk measure, I compute the t-statistic to test if beta coefficients are different 
from zero. I also test to see if they are different from one. This is important because market beta of a stock 
measures the degree to which the stock moves with the market.  A beta of one indicates that the security 
has the same riskiness as the market, while a beta greater than one indicates that the price is more volatile 
than the market.   
  We obtain the measure for unsystematic risk by calculating the variance of the residuals,
^
2() i σ ε , 
for each BHC in Equation 3 and compare the results for companies that engage in investment banking 
activities with those that do not.  To check the robustness of all results, I conducted two additional tests.  
In the first, I limit the number of companies to those that reported continuously for 10 or more years. In 
the second, rather than comparing our sample of BHCs to the overall value-weighted market index from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), I compare it to the peer group in S&P Banks 
Composite Index.   
 
2.3.  Sample Selection 
 
The analysis is conducted using CRSP data for the 1985-1999 period as well as sub-periods to account for 
the intertemporal shifts in risk-taking behavior that occurred in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (partly 
because of government regulations and implementation of the Basel Accord).
3  I constructed a monthly 
                                                           
3 The regulatory changes included the BIS capital standards of 1988 and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991.  The last introduced prompt corrective action, requiring mandatory 
 
 
9data set from January 1985 to December 1999, a total of 15 years, for all BHCs whose shares were traded 
on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, based on the matching technique that uses the following criteria.  
First, because the majority of BHCs with Section 20 affiliates are among the largest 100 U.S. banks based 
on consolidated assets, matched BHCs were also picked from that peer group. I stratify firms by asset size 
to control for a potential differential in operating characteristics of BHCs and their balance-sheet 
composition.
4  Second, the matched-adjusted comparison group includes all BHCs that did not establish a 
Section 20 subsidiary prior to 1999. Starting the sample period in 1985 allows us to observe how beta 
coefficients evolved between the period prior to 1987 (when the BHCs were first allowed to underwrite 
bank-ineligible securities) and the period after 1987.   
  The BHCs are identified using the consolidated financial statements for BHCs (FR Y-9C reports) 
from the Federal Reserve.  As a result of the matching, the sample consists of 52 bank holding companies: 
22 BHCs without Section 20 affiliates and 30 with Section 20 affiliates; all have a record with CRSP.
5   
  All monthly returns, value-weighted market indices, and three-month U.S. Treasury bill rates 
were obtained from the CRSP tapes and Haver.
6  The value-weighted market index serves as a proxy for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interventions by regulators whenever a bank’s capital falls.  It also introduced risk-based deposit insurance 
premiums, limited the use of “too big to fail” bailouts by federal regulators for large banks, and extended federal 
regulation over foreign bank branches and agencies in the Foreign Bank Supervision and Enhancement Act 
(Saunders & Cornett, 2003).     
4 Researchers have documented significant differences in production technologies and outputs across banks of 
various sizes (for example, Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1995).  In terms of balance-sheet composition, an examination of 
the composition of the BHCs’ balance sheet revealed that compared with their peers, BHCs with Section 20 
subsidiaries categorized a larger share of their assets as off-balance-sheet assets.  Off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities 
may add to the bank’s riskiness.  However, research into OBS activities suggests that some OBS instruments, 
particularly those used to hedge on-balance-sheet risks – items such as interest swaps and foreign exchange forward 
contracts – work to reduce the overall risk (Saunders and Cornett, 2003).  Furthermore, OBS activities may be 
associated with reduced risk because of what they may signal about the credit quality of the bank or its 
counterparties (Avery and Berger, 1988). 
5 CRSP and Compustat both use CUSIP and PERMNO as company identifiers, while Y-9C reports use RSSD 
identifiers.  Thus, the bank’s name is the only common identifier between BHC reports and CRSP.  Matching by 
name is a rather difficult task.  Matching based on CUSIP also proved arduous and not very reliable, because CUSIP 
numbers tend to change owing to various company transformations, such as mergers and acquisitions.  CRSP has 
developed a unique permanent issue identification number, PERMNO, and a unique permanent company 
identification number, PERMCO. These enable researchers to track the issue over time.  I used PERMNO and 
companies’ names for a more accurate match.  Some PERMNOs come from the study by Green, Lopez, and Wang 
(2003), which has a list of the top 50 BHCs in the U.S. with their holding company and PERMNO identifiers.  
6 Haver Analytics specializes in databases and software products for economic analysis and business decision-
making ( http://www.haver.com). 
 
 
10the market portfolio, and the U.S.  Treasury bill rate proxies for the risk-free return.  The value-weighted 
index contains returns (including dividends) on a value-weighted market portfolio.
7   
  The U.S. Treasury bill rate (monthly averages of daily rates, where yields are expressed in 
percent per annum) were obtained from Haver.  The rates were converted from the compounded annual to 
monthly rates using the geometric average return technique:  , where  = geometric 
average return applicable to each subset period, month; r
1 ) 1 (
/ 1 − + =
m
a m r g m g
a= the cumulative return over the entire period; 
and m is the number of equal subset periods to average the return, and is equal to 12 months.  The simple 







R , where Pt is 
the stock price on the date of the trade t, and Pt-1 is the price on the last date of the trade. All returns were 
converted to the monthly frequency.      
  
3.  Results of the CAPM Estimation 
  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics.  The average total assets for all BHCs in the sample is $66.4 
billion. It is clear that BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries are much larger, in terms of total assets, than 
BHCs without Section 20 subsidiaries (the mean total assets is $99.7 billion for the first group and $21 
billion for BHCs without Section 20 subsidiaries). Researchers have suggested that production 
technologies and outputs tend to vary across banks of different sizes (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1995).   
Therefore, I stratify the sample according to whether BHCs underwrite securities and whether BHCs are 
                                                           
7 Theoretically, the market portfolio contains all assets, whereas most tests conducted by researchers use a value- or 
equal-weighted basket of stocks as a market proxy.  This approximation may result in misleading conclusions on the 
CAPM hypothesis tests.  This argument is known in the literature as the Roll’s critique.  Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay (1997) suggest several approaches to consider if inferences are sensitive to the use of a proxy in place of 
the market portfolio.  One approach is to use a number of broader proxies for the market portfolio, such as stock-
based proxy, a stock- and bond-based proxy, or a stock-, bond-, and real-estate-based proxy.  The results of this 
approach suggest that inferences are not sensitive to the error in the proxy when viewed as a measure of the market 
portfolio (Stambaugh, 1982).  Another approach is to estimate an upper bound on the correlation between the market 
proxy return and the true market return.  As long as the correlation is high (exceeding 0.70), the rejection of the 
CAPM with a market proxy would also imply the rejection of the CAPM with the true market portfolio (Kandel and 
Stambaugh, 1987; Shanken, 1987).  
 
 
11relatively large (had total assets of $10 billion during 1990-1999) or relatively small (had total assets of 
less than or equal to $10 billion).   
  Total risk is estimated using the variance of market-based returns, (
2
RX σ ), for each BHC.  Table 2 
reports total risk for all BHCs, BHCs with and without Section 20 subsidiaries, and relatively large and 
small BHCs. Further, I divide the sample into two sub-samples: from 1985 through 1990 and from 1991 
through 1999 to account for changes in regulatory environment between a strict separation of commercial 
and investment banking and the de facto erosion of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1987 when the Federal 
Reserve allowed BHCs to establish separate Section 20 securities affiliates as investment banks. The 
results in Table 2 show that total risk of BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries is lower than that of BHCs 
without such subsidiaries. The same is true for relatively large BHCs in the sample. The table also shows 
that BHCs with securities subsidiaries (and relatively large BHCs) experienced a statistically significant 
decline in total risk between two sub-periods: pre-1990 and post-1990. These results are an important 
extension of the findings of Benston and Kaufman (1995), and Allen and Jagtiani (1999). Allen and 
Jagtiani (1999) argue that expanded bank powers, as permitted under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, will 
likely lower the total risk of the U.S. banking industry. Owing to the fact that I do not create synthetic 
universal banks, but rather use the actual proprietary data for the Section 20 affiliates and their 
consolidated BHCs, and my data cover a more recent time period, the findings of this study are more 
applicable than those in previous studies. 
    Next, using Equation 4, I am interested in finding whether there is a potential reduction in the 
systematic risk resulting from allowing banks to engage in securities activities. Because systematic risk is 
of primary concern to well-diversified shareholders, a reduction in systematic risk would provide a 
rationale for expanding bank powers into nonbank activities. Table 3 reports the results. For all BHCs 
between 1985 and 1999, systematic risk measured by the beta coefficient b1 was 1.06 and statistically 
different from zero. Furthermore, data are consistent with the hypothesis that b1 is not significantly 
 
 
12different from one.  A beta of one indicates that the security has the same price volatility (riskiness) as the 
market.   
  The coefficient on the interaction term, 2 β , is positive and significant (at the 5 percent level), 
indicating that the marginal effect of market excess returns on BHCs’ excess returns is higher in the 
presence of a Section 20 subsidiary. In other words, the market risk of BHCs that participated in securities 
underwriting was higher than that of BHCs that did not underwrite securities. Similar results emerge from 
the regressions performed on the stratified sample, based on BHCs’ assets size. Relevant results appear in 
Table 3 and show that smaller BHCs, particularly those with securities underwriting powers, were 
exposed to higher market risk.   
    The findings were robust to two additional variations. The first test limited the number of 
companies to those that reported continuously for 10 years or longer. As a result, the number of 
companies decreased from 52 (30 BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries and 22 BHCs without) to 28 BHCs: 
18 BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries and 10 without.
8  Results of these tests appear in Table 5.  For the 
second robustness check, I ran analogous estimations using S&P’s Banks Composite Index to compare 
our sample of banks to a market index of their peer firms (see Table 6).
9  Both tests conclude that market 
risk of BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries is higher than market risk of BHCs without such subsidiaries.  
These results are consistent with conclusions in Allen and Jagtiani (1999) that suggest that expanding 
bank powers into securities and insurance activities is likely to lower the overall risk of the U.S. banking 
industry but increase banks’ systematic (nondiversifiable) risk.          
  The analysis of sub-periods – before 1990 and post 1990 – is presented in   and  Table 3 Table 5.  
These results suggest that, on average, all banks took on more risk relative to the market after 1990.  The 
secular increase in bank market risk exposure during this period is consistent with a risk-enhancing 
response to the decline in bank charter values proposed by Keeley (1990). Greatly liberalized regulation 
                                                           
8 This, potentially, can cause the survivorship bias that arises when lack of data leads certain subsets of stocks to be 
excluded from the analysis (see Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997).   
9 Source: Bloomberg, value-weighted S&P Banks Composite Index, ticker: SPBNKC or S&P 500 Bank Index, for 
1990-1999.  The year 1990 is used as a starting point to limit the noise caused by the annual index rebalancing.  
 
 
13in terms of barriers to entry for nonbank competition and geographic expansion – due to interstate 
branching and deposit interest rate deregulation – had eroded the charter value of banks, possibly 
reducing banks’ incentives to act prudently with regard to risk taking. Other studies document an increase 
in banks’ risk taking following the introduction of the 1988 Basel Accord. The study by Allen and 
Jagtiani (1996) finds that compared to other financial intermediaries, including insurance companies, 
securities firms, and mutual funds, banks were taking on more market risk following the introduction of 
new risk-based capital requirements. Their study suggests that new requirements may have altered the 
optimal levels of risk that banks took and, hence, their estimates of the market beta.
In Table 3 and Table 5, coefficients on the interaction term between the dummy variable and 
market excess returns prior to 1990 and post 1991 are both significantly different from zero. These results 
are consistent with the earlier findings of higher market risk exposure at BHCs with securities 
underwriting subsidiaries. Systematic risk is priced in the market and is of primary interest to a well-
diversified investor. These findings suggest that investors should require a higher return on BHCs 
involved in securities activities. 
Table 7 reports the results for unsystematic risk, measured by the variance of residuals in the 
CAPM regressions (Equation 3). Unsystematic risk, also referred to as the residual or company-specific 
risk, can be eliminated through diversification. Overall, BHCs experienced a statistically significant 
increase in unsystematic risk between the two sub-periods: before 1990 and after 1990. The table shows 
that while BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries experienced a significant decline in unsystematic risk, 
BHCs without these subsidiaries and relatively smaller BHCs experienced an increase in unsystematic 
risk between the two sub-periods. These results parallel those reported for total risk and confirm the initial 
finding that BHCs that expanded into securities activities experienced a decline in risk. These changes in 
the total risk are of primary concern to regulators because it is more directly linked to the risk of failure.  
The decline in unsystematic risk at the BHCs that expanded into securities activities is consistent with the 
notion of diversification gains found in earlier studies (Boyd and Graham, 1986; Kwast, 1989; Bhargava 
and Fraser, 1998, among others). Conversely, the increase in total and unsystematic risk of non-Section 
 
 
1420 BHCs may reflect market concern regarding their ability to expand into newly allowed nonbank 
activities.   
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
 
This paper estimates and compares total market-based risk, systematic risk, and unsystematic risk 
measures for BHCs with and without securities underwriting subsidiaries (Section 20 subsidiaries) in the 
late 1980s and during 1990s. During this period, the Federal Reserve made several decisions that first 
eased and later repealed restrictions on banks’ affiliating with securities firms contained in the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933.  On the whole, I find evidence of significantly lower total risk and unsystematic risk 
for BHCs that expanded into investment banking activities, suggesting that these activities provided 
diversification benefits. In contrast, I find evidence that these BHCs were exposed to higher systematic 
risk. Furthermore, results of the analysis suggest that total risk of all BHCs rose in the late 1980s and 
during the 1990s, regardless of whether they participated in securities underwriting.   
Although there appear to be observable differences in the systematic risk for BHCs with and 
without Section 20 affiliates, the conclusions must be tempered with two important qualifications. First, 
the characteristics of BHCs that participate in securities underwriting differ markedly from those BHCs 
that do not. BHCs that participate in securities activities are much larger (in terms of both total assets and 
total equity) than BHCs without Section 20 subsidiaries. Hence, it is hard to find a good matching sample, 
which may contribute to the differential impact on market return sensitivity. Second, the differences in the 
systematic risk of BHCs with and without Section 20 affiliates may also reflect a market in disequilibrium 
that is adjusting to the effects of expanding scope and scale of permissible activities during the 1990s.  
Longer term studies may be needed to determine whether the findings of this paper persist as securities 
underwriting subsidiaries become more established. Such studies are necessary to ensure that the safety 
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18Table 1  Descriptive Statistics  
 
  Average Total Assets, $ Bil. 
(Standard Deviation) 
Average Total Equity, $ Bil. 
(Standard Deviation) 




    








    









This table shows the mean of total asset and total equity of BHCs, separated by whether they participate in Section 
20 activities, and whether they are relatively large (have total assets greater than $10 billion) or relatively small 
(have total assets less than or equal to $10 billion). Accounting data are averaged over the period from 1990 through 
1999.  Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.   
 
 
19Table 2  Total Risk of BHCs (1985-1999) 
 
 Whole  Sample  Pre-1990  Post-1990 






      












      













This table shows total risk as measured by the variance of market-based returns, ( ), for each BHC, separated by 
whether they participate in Section 20 activities, and whether they are relatively large (have total assets greater than 
$10 billion) or small (have total assets less than or equal to $10 billion). Panel data are for 52 BHCs (22 without 
Section 20 affiliates and 30 with Section 20 affiliates). 
2
i RX σ
*significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. ×  values before 1990 (1985-1990) and post 1990 (1991-1999) are 
significantly different from each other at the 0.05 level.  Standard deviations are in parenthesis.  Values in bold are 
different from each other (by size and by participation in Section 20 activities) according to the F-statistic.   
 
 
20Table 3  Systematic Risk (1985-1999) 
( 12 20* it i i mt i mt it RX RX Sec RX α ββ =+ + + ε , where RXit are excess returns over the U.S. Treasury bill rate for 
asset i at time t; RXmt is the t-period market portfolio excess return,  1i β  is a measure of systematic risk)  
 




















N obs.  8144  3565 
 
4579 
Overall   
2 R 0.291 0.372  0.222 
 
*significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. ×  the beta coefficient is not significantly different from 1 at the 
0.05 level.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Panel regressions for the largest 100 domestic BHCs in at least one 
year from 1985 through 1999. For a Section 20 firm, the marginal effect of market excess returns on the firm’s 









.  Positive  2 β  suggests that the security’s price is more volatile in the presence of 
a Section 20 subsidiary.    
 
 
21Table 4  Systematic Risk by Asset Size (1985-1999) 
( 1 it i i mt it RX RX α β =+ + ε , where RXit are excess returns over the U.S. Treasury bill rate for asset i at time t; RXmt is 
the t-period market portfolio excess return,  1i β  is a measure of systematic risk)  
 
  Small Banks  Large Banks 










*significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level, based on the t-test. ×  the value is not significantly different from 
1.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  This table reports systematic risk for BHCs based on assets size.  The t-
statistic tests whether systematic risk is significantly different from zero.  I also test if systematic risk is different 
from one, particularly if it is greater than one, which would suggest that asset prices are more volatile than the 
market.  Relatively large banks have total assets greater than $10 billion and relatively small banks have total assets 
less than or equal to $10 billion.   
 
 
22Table 5  Results of the CAPM Estimation for Continuous Reporters 
 ( 12 20* it i i mt i mt it RX RX Sec RX α ββ =+ + + ε , where RXit are excess returns for N assets, i denotes assets and t 
denotes time, RXmt is the t-period market portfolio excess return, and Sec20 is a dummy for whether a BHC had a 
Section 20 subsidiary)  
 
 



















N 5016  1990 3026 
Adj R
2 0.3411 0.3988  0.2899 
F-statistic 1299.01  660.8  618.5 
 
*significant at the 0.05 level  
† not significantly different from 1 (at the 0.05 significance level)  
Panel data for 28 BHCs (10 without Section 20 affiliates and 18 with Section 20 affiliates) that were among the 
largest 100 BHCs, ranked by assets, in each year between 1985 and 1999, and were traded on NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ. All returns are calculated in excess of the three-month Treasury bill rate from Haver.  
 
 
23Table 6  Results of the CAPM Estimation Using Bank Stock Index 
( 1, 2 , 20* it i i bxi t i bxi t it RX RX Sec RX α ββ =+ + + ε , where RXit is the excess return on asset i for time t, RXbxi,t is the t-




















24Table 7  Results of the CAPM Estimation: Unsystematic Risk 
( 1 it i i mt it RX RX α β =+ + ε , where RXit are excess returns for N assets, i denotes assets and t denotes time, RXmt is 
















BHCs with Sec20 (n=30)  0.0044×  
 






      
Large Banks (n=30)  0.0001 
 
0.000×   0.0004×  
   
Small Banks (n=22)  0.0098  0.008×   0.010×  




×   values for the period before 1990 and after 1990 are significantly different from each other at the 0.01 level.  In 
column 1, values in bold (in rows 2 and 3, and in rows 4 and 5) are significantly different from each other.  See 
notes to Table 2.   
 
 
 
25